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Abstract 
Patient-controlled personal health record systems can help make health care 
safer, cheaper, and more convenient by facilitating patients to 1) grant any care 
provider  access  to  their  complete  personal  health  records  anytime  from 
anywhere,  2) avoid repeated tests and 3) control their privacy transparently. In 
this paper, we present the architecture of our Privacy-aware Patient-controlled 
Personal Health Record (P
3HR) system through which a patient can view her 
integrated health history, and share her health information transparently with 
others  (e.g.,  healthcare  providers).  Access  to  the  health  information  of  a 
particular patient is completely controlled by that patient. We also carry out 
intuitive  security  and  privacy  analysis  of  the  P
3HR  system  architecture 
considering different types of security attacks. Finally, we describe a prototype 
implementation of the P
3HR system  that we developed reflecting the special 
view of Japanese society. The most important advantage of P
3HR system over 
other  existing  systems  is  that  most  likely  P
3HR  system  provides  complete 
privacy  protection  without  losing  data  accuracy.  Unlike  traditional  partially 
anonymous health records (e.g., using k-anonymity or l-diversity), the health 
records  in  P
3HR  are  closer  to  complete  anonymity,  and  yet  preserve  data 
accuracy. Our approach makes it very unlikely that patients could be identified 
by an attacker from their anonymous health records in the P
3HR system. 
Keywords: Health privacy, Personal health record, Healthcare service,  
                  Data sharing, Anonymization, Pseudonymization 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Electronic form of personal health records is both a problem and an opportunity. It 
opens new kind of threats to information leakage because electronic data are easy to 
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Abbreviations 
 
NHS  National Health Service 
PCHR  Patient-Controlled Health Record 
PHR  Personal Health Record 
P
3HR  Privacy-aware Patient-controlled Personal Health Record  
PING  Personal Internetworked Notary and Guardian 
copy, especially when the records are online. Thus, most Personal Health Records 
(PHRs) are kept local and specific to one point of care [1]. As such, most existing 
PHRs only provide the patient with limited insight into parts of the patient’s health 
care information. On the other hand, electronic health records help make health care 
safer, cheaper, and more convenient by providing complete health history, avoiding 
repeated tests, and allowing appropriate authorities to have ready access to PHRs 
anytime  anywhere.  Researchers  at  RAND  Corporation  have  estimated  that  full 
adoption of electronic health record systems in the USA would save $81 billion 
annually [2]. Emergency room physicians can avoid duplicating diagnostic tests 
when they can see instantly from digital records that a patient’s regular doctor has 
already ordered the necessary tests. This one efficiency measure alone could save 
upwards of $60 billion each year in the USA [3]. 
People usually go to the healthcare centers nearby their residence for health 
services and their health information is kept secured in the local databases of 
those healthcare centers. However, patients sometimes may need to get services 
from different healthcare centers for various reasons, including but not limited to 
(i)  unavailability  of  service  on  holidays,  (ii)  need  for  specialized  care  at 
specialized  centers,  (iii)  travelling  away  from  usual  residential  area,  and  (iv) 
moving residence. The stored health information in a healthcare center is usually 
accessible only to healthcare personnel of that center. For every healthcare center, 
there are separate systems to record patients’ health information, and information 
flow between systems is limited as illustrated in Fig. 1. For example the patient in 
Fig. 1 has health records in three different hospitals (A, B and C). Doctors of a 
particular hospital cannot access the patient’s health records that are stored in two 
other  hospitals.  As  a  consequence,  patients  often  need  to  retell  their  medical 
history and redo tests whenever they encounter a new health care provider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Health Records Stored in Local Systems in Different Healthcare 
Centers are Not Easily Available to Others, When Desired. 
 
Consider the scenario where Adrian generally gets treatment from the eye 
hospital A1, nearby his residence, for his eye problem. On a Tuesday morning, he 156       M. N. Huda et al.                                 
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noticed his left eye was blood-red and itching. He went to the eye hospital A1 and 
found  it  closed  due  to  one  week  national  holiday.  Thus,  he  visits  a  new  eye 
hospital A2. The doctor at A2 wants his previous records but he can’t recall them. 
He wishes he could have his records with him. In another scenario, Adrian has 
been treated for about one month for his ear problem by a doctor of hospital B1. 
The doctor changed his medicine several times and yet he doesn’t feel better. 
Now, Adrian is thinking of going to a different hospital B2 but feels that he 
should have all his diagnostic and treatment records from B1 for the new hospital 
B2. However, he hesitates to ask for his records from hospital B1 because he 
doesn’t want hospital B1 to know that he wants to go to a new hospital.  
Each time a patient visits a new healthcare center, she may need to request for 
her old health records from several previously visited healthcare centers, which is 
a time consuming and tedious job. If the patients can have full control over their 
own health records, they can share the appropriate part of their health records 
with  appropriate  caregivers  when  necessary.  Thus,  a  patient-controlled  health 
record (PCHR) system is necessary. The goal of a PCHR [4] is to assemble the 
patient’s complete health history and let the patient control whom to give access 
to this information and when.  
Our devised Privacy-aware Patient-controlled Personal Health Record (P
3HR) 
system allows a patient to view her integrated health history, and share her health 
information transparently with any healthcare providers. The patient controls who 
would  be  allowed  to  access  which  part  of  her  health  records  and  for  what 
duration.  In  P
3HR  database,  no  quasi-identifiers are  stored and it uses  patient 
created secret pseudonym for linking records with their respective patients. The 
resulting  database  becomes  most  likely  completely  anonymous.  Unlike  k-
anonymity  [5]  or  l-diversity  [6]  method,  attribute  values  of  a  record  are  not 
generalized or modified and hence the accuracy of the stored data is preserved. 
The  relationship  between  a  patient  and  her  pseudonym  is  known  only  to  the 
patient.  A  patient  lets  healthcare  professionals  access  her  anonymous  health 
records without revealing her secret pseudonym. Even if the records are exposed 
to unauthorized parties it is very unlikely that they would be able to identify the 
respective patients from their health records i.e., patients’ privacy is preserved. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; in section 2 we briefly present 
related previous works by others. Section 3 presents the framework and system 
security architecture in details. Section 4 illustrates basic operational steps for 
using the P
3HR system. Section 5 describes security and privacy analysis of P
3HR 
system  considering  different  types  of  attacks.  Section  6  briefly  describes  a 
prototype implementation of P
3HR system. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper 
with discussions on various related issues. 
 
2.  Related Works 
Electronic health records are widely used in developed countries. However, most of 
them are stand alone and gives patients limited or no control over their health records. 
According to the scope of this paper, we discuss only the systems that allow patient to 
control their own health records and use some privacy protection technologies. A Privacy Management Architecture for Patient-Controlled Personal Health      157 
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General anonymization methods such as k-anonymity [5] provides a degree of 
privacy protection in a way that a person in the record cannot be distinguished 
from at least k-1 individuals whose information also appears in the record set. The 
strength of this method depends on the value of k. However, the higher the values 
of k the more the data lose accuracy. The l-diversity [6] method of anonymization 
is an improvement over the k-anonymity method for special type of attacks which 
may identify a person if only k-diversity method is used. The strength of this 
method also depends on the value of l (and k) and data accuracy is not preserved. 
The  National  Health  Service  (NHS)  of  UK  [7]  is  evolving  towards  a 
comprehensive  electronic  record  that  provides  secure  and  accessible  health 
information to professionals and patients across the nation. Health smart cards 
have  been  implemented  in  many  European  countries  and  they  store  health 
information in the card themselves. iHealthRecord [8] was designed to facilitate 
online  access  to  information  and  care  for  more  than  90,000  physicians,  their 
practices and their patients. Patients retained control and responsibility to initiate 
their own iHealthRecord. It improved access to records and sharing them with 
others  in  a  more  convenient  way.  The  Indivo  [9],  formerly  Personal 
Internetworked  Notary  and  Guardian  (PING),  is  the  world's  first  patient-
controlled web-based record system, enabling a patient to own a complete, secure 
copy of her medical record, integrating health information across multiple care 
centers. Reference [10] presents a set of usage scenarios to explore the concept of 
a PCHR and outline an initial access control model for a PCHR.  
Google  and  Microsoft  launched  Google  Health  [11]  and  HealthVault  [12] 
respectively.  They  allow  individuals  to  store  and  manage  all  of  their  health 
information in one central place. One can import her health records from her 
doctors,  hospitals,  labs,  prescription  drug  plans,  and  other  healthcare 
providers.  She can also input them by herself or upload data from personal health 
monitoring devices such as glucose or blood-pressure monitors.   
Most  of  the  above  health  record  management  services  incorporate  health-
specific  search  engines  and  have  health  information  services.  Those 
implementations  provide  mechanisms  for  making  a  patient’s  health  record 
available from one hospital to another. They vary in the type of utilities/services 
that they offer and the extent the patients get control over their health records. 
Most of them don’t give full control to the patient. The smart health card systems 
that  are  implemented  in  many  European  countries  are  not  strongly  privacy 
preserving  because  any  healthcare  professional  can  read  most  of  the  health 
information from patient cards without the patients’ consent. The main limitation 
of all of the existing works is that they are not strongly privacy preserving. A 
patient can easily be de-identified from the attribute that links the records with 
specific individuals. Thus, an intruder, who gets access to the health database, can 
associate the records with an individual, resulting in poor privacy control. 
 
3.   P
3HR System 
The  devised  Privacy-aware  Patient-controlled  Personal  Health  Record  (P
3HR) 
system is not meant to be an alternative to healthcare centers’ usual local health 
records system. Instead, it is intended to provide a convenient, easy, secure and 158       M. N. Huda et al.                                 
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privacy-preserving way of making patient’s personal health history available to 
any healthcare center at any time according to the patient’s desire.  
Disclosure  of  some  personal  information  to  unauthorized  parties  doesn’t 
necessarily mean privacy loss. If the unauthorized party cannot link or associate 
the  disclosed  information  to  the  specific  individual  (to  whom  the  private 
information  belongs  to)  we  do  not  say  it  is  privacy  loss  [13].  Based  on  this 
principle, P
3HR database is made anonymous by  removing  all quasi-identifier 
information. None, except the data subject (patient), can link a particular record of 
P
3HR database to the respective patient because the patient’s unique ID (digital 
pseudonym [14]) in a record that links the record with the specific patient and is 
known to the respective patient only.  
Figure 2 illustrates the simplified framework for P
3HR system. A patient can 
personalize/customize her privacy control policy through the web based service 
from her home. The P
3HR site hosts anonymous personal health records, provides 
mechanisms for personalizing privacy control policies and provides access control 
module for doctors and patients. A hospital is equipped with IC card readers for 
authentication and browsers for browsing patients’ health records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Framework for Privacy-aware Patient-Controlled Personal 
Health Record (P
3HR) System. 
 
The P
3HR security system architecture consists of an anonymization module, 
an  anonymous  health  record  database,  the  patient’s  profile,  access  control 
modules  for  patients,  access  control  modules  for  third  parties,  and  a  privacy 
control  module  as  shown  in  Fig.  3.  The  functionality  and  operation  of  each 
module of the architecture have been described in the following subsections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Architecture of Privacy-Aware Patient-Controlled Personal Health 
Record (P
3HR) System. 
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3.1. Anonymization module 
To preserve patient’s privacy from intruders, P
3HR system stores patient’s health 
records in an anonymous form. Before storing health records from a care center 
database  (or  from  patient’s  direct  input)  into  the  P
3HR  database,  the 
anonymization module removes all identifiers and quasi-identifiers [15] from the 
records so that a particular record cannot be associated with a specific identifiable 
individual. Thus, even if an intruder gets access to the P
3HR anonymous health 
database,  he  cannot  determine  which  record  or  set  of  records  belongs  to  a 
particular patient. 
To allow an authorized party (e.g., doctor) to access a set of records of a 
particular patient legitimately, the system needs to associate each record to the 
respective patient. To achieve these two conflicting goals of anonymization and 
keep each record associated with the respective patient, the patient creates her 
unique ID (known as digital pseudonym) using Unique User-generated Digital 
Pseudonyms mechanism [16]. A patient can generate her pseudonym locally in 
her personal security environment, e.g. in her smart card or her personal digital 
assistant. There is no need for any information interchange between the patient 
and P
3HR system, except P
3HR supplies a unique identifier for each request (e.g., 
auto increment number). The digital ID is long enough and randomized so that 
one cannot guess it from the patient’s background or personal information (e.g. 
name) obtained through other channels/sources. The patient also doesn’t need to 
remember her digital ID.  
A patient’s digital ID (pseudonym) is appended to all of her records during the 
record adding process. Thus, a record in the anonymous P
3HR database contains the 
respective patient’s pseudonym along with her health information. No one can reveal 
the association of a pseudonym with its holder, unless the holder explicitly discloses 
it. Figure 4 shows the process of making an anonymous personal health record. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. After Identifiable Information is Removed, a Patient Appends Her 
Private Pseudonym with her Records. 
 
A patient stores her pseudonym into her encrypted profile. The system accepts 
a  new  pseudonym  that  is  not  already  in  use  by  others.  The  patient  needs  to 
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a new health record. The system takes the decrypted pseudonym and appends 
with her new records. A pseudonym is created for the system use only and is 
visible to its holder only. 
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3.2. Patient’s profile 
Security and privacy researchers have identified many items, which are used in 
different healthcare centers, as personally identifiable information (e.g., telephone 
numbers,  fax  numbers,  e-mail  addresses,  social  security  numbers,  health  plan 
beneficiary numbers, vehicle identifiers and serial numbers etc. [17]). Most of the 
personally identifiable information does not change frequently with time and they 
can make up a patient’s profile. 
Patients sometime require personally identifiable information to be provided 
to  the  new  healthcare  centers  that  they  visit  for  the  first  time.  For  providing 
general personal information conveniently to newly visited centers, P
3HR system 
allows a patient to store her profile, consisting of general identifiable information, 
encrypted  with  a  shared  key.  General  identifiable  information  includes  the 
information that is usually stored in a paper based health card, such as name, 
address, date of birth, phone number, and blood group. A patient can provide her 
shared key to the caregiver where she visits a care center for the first time. The 
care  centers  store  needed  general  personal  information  into  their  secure  local 
system. Some additional private information (e.g., patient’s pseudonym), which is 
used for database anonymization, is also kept encrypted with the patient’s public 
key.  The  extended  profile  is  not  shared  with  others.  Figure  5  depicts  the 
technological aspect of a patient’s encrypted profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Personally Identifiable Information is Kept Encrypted into Profile. 
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Strong authentication 
Smart cards can provide strong authentication. They are engineered to be tamper 
resistant.  The  embedded  chip  of  a  smart  card  usually  implements  some 
cryptographic  algorithm.  Each  patient  is  issued  a  personalized  smart  IC  card 
which stores patients profile information (such as name, address, date of birth, 
telephone number, health insurance number, blood group etc) in encrypted form. 
Also, healthcare providers are issued Healthcare Professional Cards. Card readers 
(installed at healthcare centers) can decrypt and read the information from a card. 
Smart card readers are used as a communications medium between the smart card 
and a host. Data stored on the cards cannot be read without going through a strict 
authorization and mutual authentication process. The security access module of 
the card reader verifies the identity of healthcare providers to read the content of 
patient’s IC card. The healthcare professional can’t read beyond the basic medical 
information without cardholder’s input of the PIN number.  
Patients usually want to access their health records from home. On the other 
hand, doctors usually want to access a patient’s health records from their working 
place  when the  patient visits  the doctor.  It  is  feasible to install card  readers  at 
healthcare centers, but not at every patient’s home. Thus, patients need a web-based 
authentication  mechanism.  For  strong  authentication  of  patients,  P
3HR  system 
requires a patient to know her private key. Since, only the respective patient (who 
has the knowledge of her private key) can decrypt her secret pseudonym, identity 
theft is effectively protected. A patient interface retrieves health records based on 
her private pseudonym which is stored encrypted into her profile. 
Accessing PHR by a doctor requires correct identification of the doctor as 
well as the patient. This is done at the doctor’s workplace by using both the 
patient’s smart IC card and the doctor’s smart IC card through a card reader. 
Figure  6  sketches  strong  authentication  mechanisms  of  P
3HR  system.  The 
patient’s smart card supplies patient’s pseudonym to identify and supply only the 
respective patient’s health records. However, this pseudonym is not disclosed to 
healthcare professionals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Strong Authentication Mechanism Protects PHR from 
Unauthorized Access. 
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that a doctor can view only the records of the respective patient that are created by 
the  doctor  himself.  Another  profile  may  set  that  a  doctor  can  view  only  the 
records  of  the  respective  patients  that  are  created  by  any  doctor  in  the  same 
department  (or  hospital)  where  the  accessing  doctor  belongs  to.  Allowing  an 
individual patient to create her own privacy policies gives flexibility and freedom 
controlling her privacy independent of others.  
Apart from the general access policies, a patient can select individual records 
or group of records based on the type of associated disease (skin disease, eye 
disease, coronary disease etc.) and create/update/delete lists of health records for 
sharing with others. Data sharing management allows a patient to select health 
care professionals (based on individual or role) for granting access to her selected 
health records. The patient can also specify specific time duration for which the 
shared data would be accessible to the selected healthcare professional. Finally, 
the patient can have a doctor’s view over her records through her data sharing 
management console and check which of her records is going to be accessible to 
the  doctor.  The  doctor’s  view  provides  complete  transparency  on  her  privacy 
control. Figure 7 illustrates data sharing through the privacy control module. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Illustration of Data Sharing through Privacy Control Module. 
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Fig. 8. Flowchart for Adding New Health Records in the P
3HR Database. 
 
4.2. Sharing basic profile 
A patient may need to provide her basic profile info when she visits a hospital for 
the  first  time.  The  patient  may  use  a  shared  key  if  the  hospital  (third-party) 
doesn’t have a card reader installed. Figure 9 illustrates a sequence diagram for 
this scenario. However, in this case the healthcare professional at the hospital 
needs to know some kind of patient ID by which he can search in the system. 
Since a patient pseudonym is private and secret, the health professional cannot 
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they cannot decrypt the patient profile without her shared key. 
An  obviously  better  or  safer  way  of  sharing  basic  profiles  is  through  the 
patients’ smart IC cards which needs card readers to be installed at the hospital. 
The sequence diagram in Fig. 10 includes this case. The card reader reads the 
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her own smart IC card. 
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4.3. Accessing shared records by third-party 
In order to access some health records of a specific patient, the accessing party 
must identify the records that are associated with a specific patient. In the P
3HR 
system, health records are linked with their subject by a private pseudonym which 
is kept encrypted into the smart IC card of the patient. A patient should keep her 
pseudonym secret even from the healthcare professionals. The card reader reads 
the pseudonym and sends it to the server without disclosing it to the healthcare 
professional. Figure 10 shows a sequence diagram for accessing a patient’s health 
record by a doctor when the patient (with her smart card) visits the hospital that 
has a card reader. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Process of Accessing Shared Personal Health Records By a Doctor 
when a Patient Visits a Hospital with her Smart Card. 
 
5.   Security and Privacy Analysis 
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3HR system.  
Attacker model 
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since secure communication between hosts can be achieved. We assume that an 
attacker  cannot  break  cryptographic  primitives  and  does  not  control  the 
communication network.  
Identity theft: The access control module allows a patient to view only the 
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another malicious patient, he cannot decrypt the pseudonym without knowing the 
key i.e., cannot view the respective patient’s records. 
Malicious database administrator or intruder: The database administrator 
(or an intruder) may get full access on the stored health records. However, since 
the relationship between the pseudonym in a record and the respective patient is 
secret and known to the respective patient only, the database administrator cannot 
find out who is the holder of the pseudonym. Thus, the records are most likely to 
be completely anonymous to him. This is true for any attacker. 
If  the  database  administrator  takes  two  snapshots  of  the  database  at  two 
instances  and  a  single  logged  in  patient  adds  new  records  in  between  the 
snapshots, then the database administrator can find out the relationship of the 
logged  in  patients  username  and  her  pseudonym.  However,  this  requires  the 
administrator to find out who was logged in and a single patient needs to be 
logged in, which is very unlikely. Even though the administrator can find out the 
username of the pseudonym holder, no other personal information is revealed to 
him. The victim patient still remains anonymous to the administrator unless the 
administrator has prior knowledge who is the holder of the username. 
Malicious collaborative patients and database administrator: When all of 
the patients (except one) and the database administrator are malicious, they can 
collaboratively find out the pseudonym of the non malicious patient. In this case, 
the malicious team should have the prior knowledge that the subject patient is a 
registered  member  in  the  system  and  all  of  them  need  to  be  collaborative. 
However, the case where all of the registered members would be malicious is 
very unlikely. 
Malicious healthcare professional: A healthcare professional can access the 
selected records of a patient that the patient grants him access to. The pseudonym of 
the  patient  is  read  through  the  smart  IC  card  reader  and  is  not  visible  to  the 
healthcare professionals. A malicious healthcare professional may try to access the 
records for which he is not authorized. Even though he came to know the basic 
personal  information  of  the  patient  from  her  smart  card,  he  cannot  know  the 
pseudonym of the patient. However, if he gets complete access to the database (say, 
with collaboration of the database administrator) he can search for the treatment 
information of the known patient and then find the patient’s pseudonym.  
From  different  attack  models,  we  can  see  that  collaborative  attack  by 
malicious healthcare professional and malicious database administrator may result 
in privacy breach in P
3HR system. All other types of attacks are not effective. 
However,  healthcare  professionals  are  generally  trusted  and  not  intuitively 
malicious. Besides, such unauthorized access can be detected by maintaining a 
proper/effective  access  log.  So,  we  can  conclude  that  the  privacy  protection 
capability of P
3RH system is very strong. 
 
6.   Prototype Implementation  
We  have  developed  a  prototype  of  our  P
3HR  system.  The  prototype 
implementation has not included authentication by using smart IC cards and uses 
only username/password based authentication as shown in Fig. 11. However, in 
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During  its  development,  we  consulted  with  the  healthcare  professionals  of 
Kochi University Hospital in Kochi prefecture, Japan, which has electronic health 
records of its patients for over 25 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Patient Authentication Screen of P
3HR System. 
 
The main menu of patient (Fig. 12) provides links to the general information 
of different hospitals in Japan and to the healthcare professionals (doctors) of 
those hospitals. It gives notification of new health records available from external 
sources where the current logged-in patient was treated recently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Main Menu (Patient). 
 
The patient can view her encrypted profile (Fig. 13) and can edit parts of the 
profile  that  are  not  static  (like  address).  It  also  has  the  patient’s  private 
pseudonym accessible through the patient’s private key. 
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Figure 14 shows part of data access policy that the patient sets for doctors. It 
specifies which records, from her record-set, a doctor can view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Part of Data Access Policy where the Patient Sets What of her 
Record Set a Doctor Can View. 
 
Figure 15 shows a simple data sharing management page where the patient 
has selected a doctor, selected a group of records based on the type of disease and 
the duration for which this share will be effective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Adding New Share. 
 
Figure  16  shows  the  list  of  shares  of  the  current  patient.  The  patient  can 
transparently view which records are shared to whom for what duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. List of Shared Records. 
 
Figure  17  illustrates  the  doctor’s  screen  in  which  the  doctor  is  trying  to 
access a patient’s profile. The system asks for the shared key to decrypt the 
basic profile. Figure 18 shows the patients health records that are shared with 
the current logged in doctor. 
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Fig. 17. Doctor Trying to Access Patient’s Basic Profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18. Patient’s Treatment Info Shared with the Logged in Doctor. 
 
In  our  implementation,  a  patient  can  replace  the  hospital  name,  that  she 
visited,  with  a  pseudonym  and  can  maintain  the  list  of  hospital  pseudonyms 
encrypted into her extended profile. This is done because we think that the actual 
hospital name info is not important to third-party doctors, but may be important to 
the patient himself. Also, the actual date value, on which the patient visited a 
hospital, is not stored in the database. The patient selects an offset value, stores 
dates that are away by the offset from the original date and encrypts the offset 
value into her encrypted profile. During display, to an authorized party, actual 
date value is displayed by adjusting the offset value. This is done to keep the 
accuracy of the displayed data but to anonymize date values to intruders. 
Healthcare  professionals  of  Kochi  University  hospital  suggested  that 
sometimes it is necessary to know all of a patient’s health history. But a patient 
may not share all of her records. How to solve this problem? To make a balance 
between  the  freedoms  of  the  patient  and  the  necessity  of  information  by  the 
doctor, our system shows the doctor what percentage of health records of the 
patient is being shared with this doctor. Thus, a doctor knows if there are any 
other records that are not shared with him and the patient fully preserves the right 
to control over her records. 
They also pointed out that many Japanese people don’t want to know actual 
disease name when it is a serious disease (e.g. cancer). This is because perhaps, 
patients may get emotionally weak when they come to know about their serious 
disease.  In  response  to  this,  we  keep  two  columns  for  disease  name,  one 
describing  disclosed  disease  name  and  the  other  one  actual  disease  name. 
Disclosed disease name is visible to the patients and disclosed disease name as 
well as actual disease name is visible to the doctors.  
 
7.   Discussion 
We  have  devised  novel  privacy  management  architecture,  called  P
3HR,  for  a 
patient-controlled  personal  health  record  system.  It  uses  strong  authentication 
mechanisms using smart IC cards. The IC card stores personal information in an 
encrypted form. If the card is lost, it must be reported to the system administrator. 
The lost card should immediately be blocked by the authentication module and A Privacy Management Architecture for Patient-Controlled Personal Health      169 
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the respective patient should be issued a new card. Also, a patient should be able 
to  use  multiple  pseudonyms  and  all  of  them  need  to  be  included  into  her 
encrypted profile so that all of her records remain associated with the patient. 
In P
3HR system, the stored data is made anonymous so that an intruder cannot 
associate  a  record  with  a  specific  individual.  We  use  patient  created  secret 
pseudonym  that  is  known  by  the  patient  only  to  associate  records  with  the 
respective  patient.  However,  the  relation  between  a  physical  patient  and  her 
pseudonym remains secret and does not need to be disclosed to anybody in order 
to  use  the  system.  The  advantage  of  our  system  is  that  our  stored  database 
becomes most likely completely anonymous and it is highly unlikely that the data 
subject  could  be  identified  from  the  stored  records.  Thus,  our  system  allows 
patients to have control over their health records which in turn helps makes health 
care safer, cheaper, and more convenient. Most of all, it supports the necessary 
functionalities for current healthcare industry with a complete privacy protection 
mechanism for patients. We have intuitively analyzed the privacy aspect of our 
system and have shown that it can tolerate almost all common attacks. We have 
developed a prototype system to illustrate the architecture and its functionalities. 
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